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Lisa Schirch
In her 2009 Congressional testimony, the then new U.S. Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton announced her intention to pursue a “3D” foreign 
policy using a multidimensional toolkit of development, diplomacy, 
and defense.  Secretary Clinton laid out a convincing argument that 
the US military could not achieve security without robust diplomatic 
and development efforts to address underlying political and economic 
grievances fueling violence.  Secretary Clinton’s leadership in the 
Obama Administration offers both hopes and challenges to a country 
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 entangled in a military industrial complex with a foreign policy trying 
to catch up to rapidly shifting international trends where threats from 
non-state actors and weak states far outpace threats from strong states. 
New initiatives to bolster attention to conflict prevention and civil 
society peacebuilding offer hope.  But these approaches face significant 
challenges in a country where corporate profiteers intent on bending 
Congress to a weaponized and aggressive foreign policy diminish at-
tempts at a foreign policy logic that does not rely on firepower. 
US Policy and Conflict Prevention
Secretary Clinton made conflict prevention and response a “core 
mission” of the U.S. Department of State and USAID in the 2011 
Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review (QDDR), a first 
ever report on the status of US capacities to relate to the longstanding 
Quadrennial Defense Review.   The QDDR restructured the State De-
partment, including the creation of a new Under Secretary for Civilian 
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Maria Otero who overseas 
a variety of new initiatives and structures such as the new Bureau on 
Conflict Stabilization Operations.  Under Secretary Otero also oversees 
the State Department’s efforts in response to the newly established 
Atrocities Prevention Board in response to President Obama’s directi-
ve to develop a Whole-of-Government effort to identify and address 
atrocity threats.
The QDDR outlines a more robust focus on civilian security and the 
protection of individuals. The State Department defines “Civilian 
Security” as helping countries build just societies that are grounded in 
democratic principles that guarantee respect for human rights and that 
apply the rule of law. The State Department notes that while “Civilian 
Security” is a new term within the State Department lexicon, it is not 
a new goal, but there are new structures to help achieve that goal of 
promoting, in their terms, “just societies.”  
As the State Department launches new programs to support conflict 
prevention, it remains unclear as to what they understand about 
conflict prevention.  For much of the last thirty years, civil society 
organizations developed conflict prevention approaches that aimed 
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to involve government in state-society partnerships to develop an 
architecture or infrastructure for preventing violent conflict.  New US 
State Department initiatives to conceive of and relate to civil society 
are essential to any successful conflict prevention efforts.
US Policy and Civil Society
President Obama’s own background in community organizing impac-
ted his Administration’s conceptualization of civil society and their 
role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.  In the past, US policy 
more often either ignored civil society’s role in preventing, managing, 
and recovering from violent conflict or it has systematically excluded 
and suppressed civil society efforts to foster change through a policy 
of “pacification” where civil society experiences violent repression for 
any effort to participate democratically. 
This historic lack of understanding of civil society led to U.S. nation-
building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US devoted 
resources to bolster widely unpopular governments in both countries 
which virtually ignored civil society.  Like the Bush Administration, the 
Obama Administration failed to understand the nature of state-society 
relations and the need to support an active civil society that could hold 
their own government in check.  The Obama Administration belate-
dly began to realize that it was impossible to impose development or 
democracy plans onto local “host” nations. 
Secretary Clinton seems to recognize that the U.S. needs to work 
in partnership with people abroad to develop homegrown forms of 
democracy and locally guided development. Security and stability 
require a combination of a citizen-oriented state held to account by 
an active civil society.  In 2012, Secretary Clinton launched a one-year 
“Strategic Civil Society Dialogue” designed to listen to popular and 
influential civil society leaders from countries such as Egypt, Yemen 
and Afghanistan.  In Secretary Clinton’s words, there are three essential 
components to democratic and stable societies: citizen-oriented states, 
private business sector, and an active civil society.
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The logical conclusion to this theory is that elite-captured states that 
serve the interests of a private business sector, but ignore or repress 
civil society result in corrupt governments, human rights violations 
and unstable, violent societies.
The Obama Administration’s articulation and recognition of civil 
society’s role in conflict prevention, stabilization and democratization 
is laudable. But the seeds of change need more attention.  Too many 
policymakers in the US and abroad still resort to pacification of civil 
society. For example, Global War on Terror legislation illustrates a 
fundamental distrust of all civil society organizations as it makes it 
illegal for civil society organizations in the US and many other coun-
tries to engage with armed groups to train them in negotiation or 
human rights. These policies ignore historical evidence shoring that 
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civil society organizations play critical roles in bringing armed groups 
to a negotiation table that leads to a cessation of violence.  
Even today, US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan has few mechanisms 
for listening to Afghans or Iraqis express their own views on US policy. 
Ironically, the US desire to foster democracy in these countries over-
looked the most important strategy: “democratic policymaking” where 
the people impacted by US policy have a voice in shaping US policy. 
Instead, USAID invites civil society organizations to be “implementing 
partners” to carry out projects designed in Washington aimed to help 
bring stability abroad.  But very rarely are local civil society organiza-
tions invited to take part in conflict assessment processes where they 
articulate their often vastly different understanding of the drivers and 
root causes of conflict.  Using civil society as “implementing partners” 
is only a small improvement on pacification techniques.  
In order to fully align the US State Department’s formula for stable, 
democratic states, US foreign policy should begin to create an in-
frastructure for a more democratic policymaking where the voices of 
civil society in every country abroad help to shape US policy in that 
country.  Without these channels, both the US government and local 
governments in these countries are elite-captured: serving the interests 
of the wealthy, but ultimately setting the foundation for inequality, 
human rights violations, corruption and instability.
The Challenges of Balancing Development, Diplomacy 
and Defense
Despite the Obama Administrations new structures and initiatives 
supporting a 3D approach, a US foreign policy based on conflict pre-
vention and robust support for civil society faces immense challenges.
Ideally, a 3D foreign policy keeps the integrity of each approach without 
blending development, diplomacy, and defense together; pulling go-
vernment personnel from State Department, Defense Department 
and USAID outside of their silos to think and talk together.  But in 
order for development and diplomacy to be effective, U.S. agencies 
need to ensure that the Pentagon does not dictate development and 
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diplomacy policy, nor ask military soliders to carry out development 
tasks on the ground in an effort to win short-term goodwill from local 
people.   Conflict prevention efforts involving development diplomacy 
require a long-term focus on building relationships and addressing root 
causes of violence.  Diplomacy should draw on principled negotiation 
techniques rather than a coercion that too often sounds like “if you 
don’t do what we tell you to do, we will bomb you.” But a US 3D 
approach does not include safeguards from preventing the Pentagon 
from engaging or leading all three “Ds”.
In terms of their budgets, staffing and links with Congress, the Penta-
gon far outweighs the power of the Department of State and USAID. 
Secretary Clinton needs to address the vast inequities in U.S. budgets 
for development, diplomacy, and defense.  The military budget is too 
big and full of waste.  The development and diplomacy budgets are 
too small and contain too many earmarks for special interests and pro-
gram restrictions set by Congress.  A new foreign policy is not possible 
without matching a 3D strategy to smarter resource planning.  
The U.S. military budget surpasses the military expenditures of all 
other countries combined. The Defense Department’s proportion of 
U.S. development funds jumped from 6% to almost 25% in the last few 
years.  Without shifting security dollars from the Defense Department 
over to the State Department and USAID, the military will be the U.S.’s 
default foreign policy tool. Even Secretary of Defense Gates chastises 
Congress’ underfunding of U.S. civilian agencies.  The United King-
dom, Canada, and other countries reflect their commitment to civilian 
expertise in development and diplomacy with budgets to match.  
Congress continues to allow the Department of Defense to use 
USAID and State Department programs and budgets toward short 
term counter terrorism efforts aimed at an winning hearts and minds 
that is overly-simplistic and largely without evidence that it works. 
Development and diplomacy require a patient, long term approach to 
address poverty and build good governance in fragile states.  Instead, 
Congress needs to safeguard the State Department and USAID’s me-
dium and long-term programs from short term demands.  In addition, 
the US government needs to add a cabinet-level position to protect 
U.S. interests in fostering global development.  Without a high-level 
advocate, development funds are often diverted toward aiding oft-
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corrupt governments in exchange for their short-term cooperation 
with the U.S.
At its best, a 3D foreign policy will create a more effective “first re-
sort” to address global conflicts and crises through development and 
diplomacy.  These preventive approaches will save lives at home and 
abroad.  They will also save money, easing the current over-reliance 
on the expensive and dangerous “last resort” of military defense.  But 
getting to this ideal will require a much more thoughtful government 
approach to overcoming the many obstacles to progress.
